Daniel English, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Robert English v. Albert Kienke : Unknown by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1989
Daniel English, as Personal Representative of the
Estate of Robert English v. Albert Kienke :
Unknown
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Fred R. Silvester, Charles P. Sampson, Clauida F. Berry; Suitter, Axland, Armstrong & Hanson;
attorneys for appellant.
Aaron Alma Nelson; Hanson, Nelson, Chipman & Quigley; Allan L. Larson; Snow, Christensen &
Martineau; counsel for respondents.
This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, English v. Kienke, No. 890281.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1989).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/2639
u i r t i i 
DOCUMENT 
" • u BRIEE 
DOCKET NO. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH "p'? ^ w,r U 
DANIEL ENGLISH, as Personal 
Representative of the Estate 
of ROBERT ENGLISH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
ALBERT KIENKE, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
Case No. 890281 
Priority No. 13(b) 
SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITIES 
APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Date of Final Judgment - June 2, 1989 
Case No. 880236-CA 
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Counsel for Appellant Daniel English submits the 
enclosed pleadings and authorities to assist the Court in its 
decision in this action: 
1. Memorandum Decision of the trial court and Opinion 
of the Utah Court of Appeals improperly omitted from Appellant's 
Brief; 
2. Citations requested by the Court regarding repair 
work as "part or process" in the trade or business of apartment 
rental• 
(a) Sorenson v. Industrial Commission, 598 P.2d 362 
(Utah 1979); cited with approval in Board of Education of Alpine 
School Dist. v, Olsen, 684 P.2d 49, 52 (Utah 1984); and 
(b) Summerville v« Industrial Commission, 113 Utah 
507, 196 P.2d 718 (1948), cited with approval in Sorenson. 
3. The statutory citation for the "casual" employment 
exception is Utah Code Ann. §35-1-43(1)(b) (1953, as amended 
1985) . 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
—OOOoo— 
Daniel English, as Personal 
Representative of the Estate 
of Robert English, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Albert Kienke, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable David S. Young 
Attorneys: Fred R. Silvester, Charles P. Sampson, and Claudia 
Berry, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
Aaron Alma Nelson and Allan L. Larson, Salt Lake 
City, for Respondent 
Before Judges Bench, Garff, and Orme. 
BENCH, Judge: 
Plaintiff appeals entry of summary judgment for defendant in 
a wrongful death action. We affirm, finding no error in the 
trial court's determination that plaintiffs decedent was liable 
as a matter of law for the dangerous condition which he created 
and which resulted in his death. 
On January 4, 1986, 28-year-old graduate student Robert 
English was killed in a tragic accident while rebuilding the 
front porch of his leased house at 1031 Windsor Street, Salt 
Lake City. Temporary supports placed under the roof of the 
porch by the decedent gave way, causing the roof to fall onto 
him. 
Plaintiff Daniel English, personal representative of 
decedent's estate, filed a negligence action against the 
property owner, defendant Albert Kienke* The record shows that 
defendant/ by oral agreement, permitted the decedent to live in 
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the house rent-free in exchange for decedent's labor in making 
repairs to the house. Although defendant had told decedent the 
front porch needed repair, decedent planned and executed the 
work himself, and defendant supplied or paid for the materials. 
Plaintiff filed two motions for partial summary judgment on 
the issue of whether an employee-employer relationship existed 
between the parties, and defendant filed a motion for summary 
judgment. In a memorandum decision, the district court found 
that the decedent had created the dangerous condition which 
killed him, and that he was an "independent contractor" under 
workers9 compensation law. The trial court entered summary 
judgment for defendant and denied plaintiff*s motions. 
Plaintiff claims on appeal that entry of summary judgment 
for defendant is in error, contending that there are unresolved 
factual issues involving the reasonableness of the risk of harm 
and whether the dangerous condition of the porch was within 
defendant's knowledge. Plaintiff notes that "[w]hether an 
unreasonable risk of harm exist[s] is a determination of fact to 
be made by the jury." Wagoner v. Waterslide Inc.. 744 P.2d 
1012, 1013 (Utah App. 1987). 
Summary judgment may be granted whenever the trial court 
determines that "there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Our analytical standard 
for review of a summary judgment is the same as that of the 
trial court: we review the facts and inferences from those 
facts in the light most favorable to the losing party. Seftel 
v. Capital Citv Bank, 767 P.2d 941, 946 (Utah App. 1989). If we 
conclude that a genuine issue of material fact exists, the 
summary judgment will be overturned and the case remanded for 
further proceedings on that issue. I&. Where no material facts 
remain unresolved, .we examine the trial court's conclusions of 
law and review them for correctness. Bonham v. Morgan, 102 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 8, 9 (1989) (per curiam). 
We note that summary judgment should be granted with great 
caution where negligence is alleged. Apache Tank Lines, Inc. v. 
Oifinsx, 706 P.2d 614, 615 (Utah 1985). This is because 
"[i]ssues of negligence ordinarily present questions of fact to 
be resolved by the fact finder." I£. "It is only when the 
facts are undisputed and but one reasonable conclusion can be 
drawn therefrom that such issues become questions of law." I&. 
Accordingly, summary judgment is reserved for only the most 
clear-cut negligence cases. Ingram v. Salt Lake Citv, 733 P.2d 
126, 126 (Utah 1987) (per curiam), fififi, a^g., Webster v. Sill. 
675 P.2d 1170 (Utah 1983) (summary judgment affirmed for 
landlord where tenant was injured while mowing lawn in exchange 
for rent reduction). 
The trial court granted summary judgment for defendant, 
relying on the holding of Steele v. Denver & Rio Grande Western 
R.R. Co., 16 Utah 2d 127, 396 P.2d 751 (1964). Sisals., however, 
was decided on the basis of the duty owed by a landowner to an 
"invitee." This is consistent with the common law notion that 
the duty of care owed to a person injured on another's property 
depended on whether the injured party was classified as an 
invitee, licensee, or trespasser. Gregory v. Fourthwest inv.. 
Ltd.. 754 P.2d 89, 91 (Utah App. 1988). 
Utah has now abandoned these artificial common law 
categories, and expanded the landlord's common law duty. Id. 
It is, therefore, unnecessary to wrestle with the issue of 
whether at the time of the accident decedent could best be 
described as a "licensee" or "invitee." Rather, we now impose 
upon landowners "a duty to exercise reasonable care toward their 
tenants in all circumstances." Id. (quoting Williams v. Melby. 
699 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1985)). That duty of reasonable care 
encompasses care to assure their property is "reasonably safe 
and suitable for intended uses." Stephenson v. Warner. 581 P.2d 
567, 568 (Utah 1978). Landowners may be liable for injuries 
caused by dangerous conditions which they create, and which they 
should reasonably foresee would expose others to an unreasonable 
risk of harm. Id. Landowners are not liable, however, if 
tenants fail to keep the premises "reasonably safe and in good 
repair." Id* Moreover, tenants are liable for any dangerous 
condition on the premises which they create or permit to come 
into existence after they have taken possession. Id. at 568-69; 
£££ generally. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 355 (1965). 
In granting summary judgment to defendant, the trial court 
apparently considered the pleadings, answers to defendant's 
interrogatories, and the depositions of the parties.1 The 
trial court then determined that "the decedent created the risk 
by removing the foundational support for the porch," a 
conclusion clearly supported by the record. It is.clear that 
decedent did all of the porch reconstruction himself, and was so 
engaged when the accident occurred. It is also .clear that 
decedent placed temporary supports under the roo'f and did so 
without the assistance of the defendant. None of these material 
facts were disputed. Accordingly, only one reasonable 
conclusion can be drawn—decedent created the dangerous 
1. We can only presume that the trial court did not consider 
other depositions in the record since the court never referred 
to them and they were filed after the date of summary judgment. 
Depositions not considered below may not be considered on 
appeal. Sfift Reliable Furniture Co. v. Fidelity and Guar. Ins. 
Underwriters. Inc.. 14 Utah 2d 169, 380 P.2d 135 (1963); 
Rosander v. Larsen. 14 Utah 2d 1, 376 P.2d 146 (1962). 
condition that caused his own death* 
We find no error in the trial court's ruling that it was the 
decedent, not the defendant, who was negligent as a matter of 
law. Stephenson established that the tenant who creates a 
dangerous condition is responsible for his own injury. Id* at 
568-69. Although the trial court did not cite Stephenson as the 
legal basis for its decision, we may affirm the trial court on 
any proper legal basis. Berube v. Fashion Centre. Ltd.. 104 
Utah Adv. Rep. 4, 7 (1989); Tavlor v. Estate of Tavlor, 770 P.2d 
163, 169 (Utah App. 1989). 
Plaintiff further characterizes the relationship between 
defendant and the decedent as one of employer-employee, and 
claims that the trial court erred in finding otherwise. 
Plaintiff seeks resolution of this issue in his favor in order 
to impose a statutory duty upon defendant to provide a safe 
workplace. Sfifl Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-12 (1988). If defendant 
was deemed to be an employer and failed to secure workers* 
compensation protection for the decedent, plaintiff could also 
seek certain statutory penalties against defendant. £££ Utah 
Code Ann. § 35-1-57 (permitting civil actions by injured 
employees against such employers where injury is "caused by the 
wrongful act, neglect or default of the employer"). Since it is 
conclusive as a matter of law, however, that decedent, not 
defendant, was the negligent party, we need not reach the issue 
of statutory employment. Sfift Peterson V« Sorensen* 91 Utah 507, 
65 P.2d 12, 16 (1937) (noncompliance with workers9 compensation 
act does not justify recovery for negligence charged but not 
proven). 
Summary judgment for defendant is affirmed. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
Gregory K* Orrae, Judge 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DANIEL ENGLISH, as Executor : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
of the Estate of ROBERT ENGLISH, 
: CIVIL NO. C-86-1792 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ALBERT KIENKE, 
Defendant4 
The above-entitled matter came on for consideration by the 
Court on the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court 
heard the argument of the respective attorneys, and based upon 
the arguments and the filed Memoranda, both in support and in 
opposition, the Court makes this its 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
The Court finds that the provisions of Section 342 of the 
Restatement of Torts, as discussed further in the case of Steel 
v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railway Co., 396 P.2d 751, 16 Utah 
2d 127 (1964), require the Court to conclude that the Motion for 
Summary Judgment on behalf of the defendant should be granted. 
The Court finds that in the critical language related to the 
requirements of a landowner to a licensee there must be met, 
prior to liability, the following conditions: 
ENGLISH V. KEENKE PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(a) The possessor knows or has reason to know of 
the condition and should realize that it involves an 
unreasonable risk of harm to such licensees, and should 
expect that they will not discover or realize the 
danger, and 
(b) He fails to exercise reasonable care to make 
the condition safe, and/or to warn the licensee of the 
condition and the risk involved, and 
(c) The licensees do not know or have reason to 
know of the condition and the risk involved. 
The Court finds under the circumstances of this case that 
reasonable minds could not differ in the obligation expected of 
the defendant to recognize the risk. First, the Court finds that 
the decedent created the risk by removing the foundational 
support for the porch, and second, that he did so without the 
approval of the defendant. Certainly the decedent would be 
charged with perceiving the risk at a level at least equal to or 
greater than that required of the defendant. When the defendant 
came by the residential property and observed the changes created 
by the decedent, the defendant had no greater responsibility to 
perceive the risk than that of the decedent. 
The Court cannot find that the defendant should have 
realized that the circumstances involved a "unreasonable risk of 
harm" to the licensee, and that the defendant ". . . should 
expect that they [the decedent] will not discover or realize the 
danger." The Court cannot find that the defendant had a greater 
responsibility to inform the decedent of the risk than the 
decedent should have perceived on his own. 
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Further, the Court cannot find that the defendant failed to 
exercise reasonable care to make the condition safe, nor that the 
decedent could not know, or have reason to know of the condition 
and the relative risk. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds that the 
defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted. The 
Court further finds that the decedent was an independent 
contractor, and not an employee under the Utah Workers 
Compensation Act, and finally, based upon the foregoing, the 
Court cannot find any basis upon which punitive damages could be 
awarded. Thus, the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is 
granted in each particular. 
Dated this 3 / dav of August, 1987. 
DAVID S./YOUNG 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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